“I am going to do everything for our country to save our nation. From danger,” de la Espriella yelled at the audience. “And that danger has a name … narcoterrorism!”

He’s expected to defeat Iván Cepeda, the left-wing candidate endorsed by Colombia’s current president, Gustavo Petro, in the June 21 runoff. He also recently received the endorsement of United States President Donald Trump.

“The results of this Election are very important to the future of Colombia and its relationship to the United States,” Trump posted to Truth Social. “Because of his tremendous accomplishments in life, and his political support for me, personally, it is my Honor to give Abelardo my Complete and Total Endorsement.”

De la Espriella has dual citizenship with the US. He also has a line of somewhat unusual branded products, reminiscent of Trump’s own line of products. He’s marketed rum, menswear products and music albums of him singing hits in “de la Esperiella style.”

While Colombia has collaborated with US efforts to counter the drug trade, President Petro has denounced Trump’s boat strikes in the Caribbean. So far more than 200 people have been killed in the attacks. De la Espriella has promised to add to that number. He’s called Petro a “criminal” and “drug addict.” 

His platform is a libertarian economic agenda—he promises to take a “chainsaw” to government spending, except the armed forces—coupled with an aggressive, militarized crackdown on the drug trade. De la Espriella’s ascendance represents yet another instance of right-wing ideology surging in Latin America.

A former defense attorney, de la Espriella once represented wealthy businessmen known for drug trafficking. He’s pledged a range of militarized crackdowns if elected, including a vast expansion of private prisons to hold “cockroaches and rats.” 

Trump has called Cepeda a “Radical Left Marxist.”

Inspired by El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, who has dubbed himself “the world’s coolest dictator,” de la Espriella plans to build 10 mega-prisons modeled after El Salvador’s infamous CECOT. He’s also promised to deport immigrants who engage in criminal activity; almost all of the approximately 3 million immigrants living in Colombia are Venezuelan. 

“It’s a similar script. A lot of Latin American countries are being overtaken by right-wing forces,” Sanho Tree, director of the Drug Policy Project at the Institute for Policy Studies, told Filter. “He’s very Trumpian. And models himself after Bukele. It’s a return to the bad old days.”

Tree noted a historical parallel with former Colombian president Alvaro Uribe. 

“He was a strongman,” Tree said. “In the aughts, the country was dominated by paramilitary narco traffickers. It was a horrible human rights environment.”

In the 2000s, Uribe’s military lured thousands of impoverished young men into remote areas, executed them and dressed them in Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) fatigues to falsely boost their body count. De la Espriella has called the former president a patriot. His father coordinated a regional campaign for Uribe, and the families remain close.

Mass incarceration of people who use or sell drugs has never brought the drug trade to an end. Whenever someone is imprisoned, or killed in government air strikes, someone else will take their place. Taking out leadership of transnational drug-trafficking groups just creates a temporary power vacuum, and increases violence between groups and against civilians.

Left-wing rival Cepeda often speaks of the drug war as a failure, and advocates instead for investment in disenfranchised neighborhoods. Trump has called Cepeda a “Radical Left Marxist.”

Image via Wikipedia/Creative Commons 3.0/Trump White House Archives

The post Trump-Endorsed de la Espriella Pulls Ahead in Colombia Presidential Race appeared first on Filter.

“[The toxic drug supply crisis] is the leading cause of death for people between 19 and 59 in this province,” BC Human Rights Commissioner Kasari Govender told Filter. “The fact is that this toxic drug crisis won’t be solved without an approach that focuses on safer supply and harm reduction.”

Under international human rights law and Canadian constitutional law, governments have an obligation to protect the right to life and security and promote the health of individuals in their jurisdictions, which, the statement noted, includes “removing life threatening risks to individuals in consumer products.”

“We’re asking for harm reduction to be funded and to be supported.”

In the position statement, the commissioner wrote that Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—the right to life, liberty and security of the person—is “engaged when government policy contributes to preventable death, such as by denying access to harm reduction services,” and that inadequately addressing underlying factors such as trauma and mental health conditions “over the course of decades, is a failing of provincial and federal social policy to uphold rights.”

Although the position statement does not include a formal set of recommendations for the province, Govender told Filter that her office is “calling for increased access to safe supply … We’re asking for harm reduction to be funded and to be supported. We’re also asking for involuntary treatment to be treated with a variety of safeguards in place.”

Safe Supply, Diversion and Rollback

In March 2020, BC became the first jurisdiction in Canada to provide free prescribed pharmaceutical-grade opioids (primarily hydromorphone and morphine) to individuals deemed at high risk of overdose. The program became permanent in July 2021, and expanded to include injectable fentanyl.

Initiatives like BC’s, in addition to 10 similar pilot projects implemented by Health Canada, were demonstrably effective at decreasing risk of overdose death, though many critics also pointed to the limited access to these programs.

The BC human rights commissioner’s position statement is just the latest in a slew of testimony from provincial officials calling for bolder interventions.

In recent years, the province has largely ignored appeals, and stalled or rolled back policies that focused on harm reduction efforts like prescribed alternatives.

Lisa LaPointe, BC’s chief coroner at the time, along with a Death Review Panel of substance use specialists, regional health leaders, researchers, a police chief, BC’s representative for children and youth, and a peer clinical adviser, called for the expansion of non-medical safe supply options in their 2023 report.

In 2023 and 2024, BC Provincial Health Officer Dr. Bonnie Henry likewise echoed calls for a broader range of substances and access models to be included, including non-prescriber based options.

But in recent years, the province has largely ignored appeals from officials and numerous peer-led organizations, and stalled or rolled back policies that focused on harm reduction efforts like prescribed alternatives.

In February 2025, the province overhauled its safe supply program to require witnessed dosing for all new clients, effectively ending the take-home model for prescribed alternatives and significantly limiting access.

It claimed this was an effort to reduce drug diversion and “hold bad actors accountable for putting people and communities at risk,” according to a BC government news release.

But Govender emphasized that while some concerns around diversion may be justified, they should not supplant the demonstrated benefits of a robust safer supply program. “[Diversion] is about [pharmacies] abusing the law and the programs that were available to them. We should be addressing that problem, not taking away the entire system,” she said. “It’s a classic ‘throwing the baby out with the bath water’ situation.”

“The ultimate effect of [diversion] is to have safer drugs on the market, so ultimately that still probably did save some lives.”

In 2025, leaked information claimed a number of pharmacies (60 out of 1,400) were involved in diverting prescription opioids. The commissioner’s position statement noted that “as a result, the Ministry of Health quickly backtracked on their efforts,” and that “notably, there is no evidence to suggest that [diversion was] inherent in the safer supply program rather than a problem of illegal action taken by individuals within an otherwise legitimate public health effort.”

The political damage was done, however, and perhaps this was always likely. In 2024, BC’s Auditor General report had found that “there were no strategies to address major implementation barriers” of safe supply, and as a result, “the provincial government could not adequately communicate the effectiveness of programs and therefore was more susceptible to political critiques about the risks … such as diversion.”

Govender told Filter that “the ultimate effect of [diversion] is to have safer drugs on the market, so ultimately that still probably did save some lives … diversion is a far easier issue to tackle than the toxic drug crisis itself.” 

Involuntary Drug Treatment

A key component of the commissioner’s statement notes that while the province has been backtracking on safe supply and harm reduction-oriented policies, it has been simultaneously boosting its investment in involuntary drug treatment.

There is currently limited evidence to support the use of involuntary treatment for substance use disorder alone. Other evidence has associated involuntary treatment with increased overdose risk, and some experts deem the practice inherently unethical.

Govender said that “involuntary treatment shouldn’t exist only for substance use disorders … The science is really problematic on this.”

BC’s Mental Health Act has always allowed for the involuntary treatment for mental health disorders under certain conditions. But in September 2024, the governing BC New Democratic Party announced plans to expand the infrastructure used to detain people with substance use disorders and co-occurring conditions who could be certified under the Act.

Govender said that “involuntary treatment shouldn’t exist only for substance use disorders … The science is really problematic on this.”

On November 24 the province announced that it would be proposing what some experts have called a very “technical” and “confusing” change to the act.

The move came in the midst of an ongoing Charter challenge to BC’s Mental Health Act, and if passed the change would not impact eligibility criteria for involuntary treatment. It would, however, provide additional protections for health care workers engaged in it, should they face legal action. It will also “help clarify the purpose of the act, which is to provide treatment to those who require it,” according to a BC government news release.

“It is unclear what the recent amendments to the MHA will mean in practice,” Govender said. “The government has been clear that deemed consent—which is currently before the courts in a constitutional challenge—remains in the law. But the result is definitely still to be determined.”

“Our investments should be going towards voluntary treatments … Not only does that respect rights to agency, but it is also more effective.”

Earlier in 2025, BC announced the opening of 18 involuntary beds at the Alouette Homes and 10 at the Surrey Pretrial Centre, where participants were being housed in the solitary confinement unit. While the government touted adding 760 new voluntary treatment beds since 2017, a recent news release also stated that “work is underway to open an additional 100 involuntary care beds in Surrey and Prince George facilities.”

“Our investments should be going towards voluntary treatments,” Govender said. “We need to properly fund voluntary services so that people have places to go when they choose to go. Not only does that respect their rights to agency, but it is also more effective.”

The commissioner’s position statement notes that “until these services actually meet demand, using evidence of the tragic harms of the toxic drug crisis to support violating people’s liberty rights not only lacks credibility, but also seriously undermines human rights protections.”

No significant changes have been made to BC’s Mental Health Act as yet, but Govender noted that Dr. Daniel Vigo, the scientific advisor to BC Premier David Eby, released guidance to psychiatrists on the use of involuntary treatment in March 2025.

“We don’t know yet the impact of that and whether that’s increased …  our use of involuntary treatment, but that’s certainly presented as a possibility because there’s just been so much focus on involuntary approaches,” Govender said. 

The Commissioner’s Powers

Govender was appointed as BC’s first independent human rights commissioner in September 2019. After serving her first five-year term, she was unanimously reappointed for a second term by the BC legislature in May 2024. The release of a position statement, though sure to generate attention, falls on the softer end of her powers.

Govender has the ability to use formal measures such as inquiries and official reports, which unlike position statements generally include recommendations. She also has legal powers to obtain information.

Although she does not have the ability to mandate recommendations, she explained, she can “require [that] those I make recommendations to report back to me on how well they’re doing in implementing the recommendation.”

“Part of the goal of this statement for our office is to have a jumping-off point … so that we can [then] make [formal] recommendations.”

Based on a recent report, the province and private entities to which she has issued recommendations fully or partially implement them about 59 per cent of the time.

“Part of the goal of this statement for our office is to have a jumping-off point … so that we can [then] make [formal] recommendations,” Govender said.

She also has the power to act as intervenor in cases before the BC Supreme Court. When asked if she intended to be an intervenor in the DULF constitutional challenge or any other upcoming court cases regarding the overdose crisis, she declined to comment.

However, she suggested that this position statement is only the beginning for her office, which is set to host a December 10 discussion with Govender, former Chief Coroner Lapointe and the Canadian Mental Health Association’s Jonny Morris.

Govender’s many past roles at human rights-oriented nonprofits include a spell on the board of Pivot Legal Society, which advocates for drug policy reform; as BC human rights commissioner, she could do so with substantial influence. While this is the first time that her office has addressed the toxic drug supply crisis head on, it has previously released letters on issues relating to poverty and housing, and inquiries into policing, as well as initiatives around equitable health care access.

“I’m not sure yet what our next steps will be,” Govender said of the commission’s drug policy involvement, “but this certainly is one of the focuses of our work going forward.”

Photograph of an April 2025 rally to mark the ninth anniversary of the BC government declaring the overdose crisis a public health emergency, by Dustin Godfrey

The post BC Human Rights Commissioner Slams Overdose Inaction as “Violation” appeared first on Filter.

House Bill 55 “Treatment of Inmates” would grant everyone in FDC custody a handful of basic rights: “proper ventilation” in their living units; mealtimes that last at least 20 minutes; “adequate food supply” during disruptions to regular kitchen services, via relationships with local pantries; and access to basic health and hygiene items including soap, toothpaste, menstrual pads, tampons and personal protective equipment.

They would also have the right to file grievances if the aforementioned rights are violated. FDC would be required to distribute a written copy of the rights to everyone entering the system. Lastly, the bill would broaden eligibility for conditional medical release by slightly relaxing the definition of “permanently incapacitated” to include “physical disability, impairment or handicap.”

These rights would represent substantial changes, but still leave plenty of leeway for FDC to wriggle out of them. For example, the department would be required to provide the basic hygiene items upon request, essentially making this an “opt-in” right rather than an “opt-out.”

The right to proper ventilation, meanwhile, requires air-conditioning or air-cooling systems in all housing units—unless it’s a building already in use (as opposed to new construction down the line) that can’t be retrofitted. In that case, the requirement is for “exhaust and air circulators sufficient to provide a safe and healthful environment.” 

At least 75 percent of FDC facilities lack air-conditioning. Multiple in-custody deaths have been attributed to the temperatures inside cells, which can reportedly exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit. But cost projections for modernizing and repairing FDC facilities range from $6 billion to $12 billion, with upwards of $580 million for air-conditioning alone. It’s safe to assume that if compelled to add air-conditioning, FDC would report back that few if any buildings could be retrofitted.

The current version is Hart’s sixth attempt. Her term will end in 2026.

In 2019, Hart visited Lowell Correctional Institution after corrections officers assaulted 51-year-old Cheryl Weimar and left her paralyzed from the neck down. In addition to the culture of violence perpetrated by staff, Hart condemned the facility for extreme heat, soap rationing, distribution of panty liners instead of actual menstrual pads, and mealtimes that lasted between three and five minutes.

Every year since then she has filed a proposal for a prisoner bill of rights, and every year it has died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee.

“We’ve got to take care of people,” Hart told WCJB in February. “That’s what we are here to do. When you are incarcerated, you’re in our care.”

In early 2025, after refiling the bill once again, she expressed hope that committee chairs would finally consider it. She told WFLA that she was “open to massaging any of the bills” she sponsors, and had been engaged in discussions about what would make her legislation palatable to her Republican colleagues. In June, the bill died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee.

The current version is Hart’s sixth attempt. Her term will end in 2026.

Earlier in 2025, a separate proposal from Hart, requiring the state parole board to factor in prisoners’ use of “education, vocation and self-betterment programs” when deciding whether to grant early release, was unanimously approved by both the House and Senate. It was then vetoed by Governor Ron DeSantis (R), who stated it “would likely result in making Florida’s parole system more lenient.” With exceptions for about 4 percent of the current prison population, Florida’s parole system doesn’t consider anyone convicted after 1983.

Image (cropped) via Florida Department of Corrections

The post Florida Prisoner Bill of Rights Faces House Subcommittee Hurdle, Again appeared first on Filter.

The peer-based organization’s remit is “to promote the health and defend the human rights of people who use drugs globally by challenging and exposing stigma, discrimination and the negative impacts of criminalization on peers and communities.”

During Chang’s tenure, INPUD has expanded from a predominantly Global-North membership to incorporate regional networks covering Africa, Asia and Latin America. 

January is her last month in the role; she’ll soon be taking a position at another human rights organization. So it’s a moment to reflect on both her achievements and the renewed attacks on harm reduction from right-wing populists worldwide.

Born in Salt Lake City, Chang grew up in Sydney, Australia, in a “first-generation Chinese immigrant family.” She started using drugs as a teenager—she continues to identify as a woman who uses drugs—and has been an anti-racist and feminist activist since university. 

In the following years, she worked in the HIV and community health fields, focusing primarily on harm reduction and drug policy advocacy from 2015. She has worked with communities in China, India and Thailand, and was based in Milan, Italy, until a recent move to London.

Chang is also a narcofeminist activist. She has written defining texts on narcofeminism—a term coined in 2018 by women using drugs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia—which she’s described as “a rallying principle for women who use drugs to establish links between feminist organizing and drug user activism.” Chang has worked with peers to have women and drugs recognized as a feminist issue.

As Chang steps down from INPUD—amid global threats that carry particular dangers for INPUD’s core membership of people who use opioids and inject drugs—she spoke with Filter about her life’s work, her conception of feminism and the challenges ahead. 

“This person stuck their neck out to connect me to this harm reduction clinic in the informal settlements of Kolkata.”

Carrie Lou Hamilton: How did your personal journey lead to your involvement in the global movement of people who use drugs?

Judy Chang: What planted the seed was a sense that something is wrong with the world, that many people have it harder due to structural issues. I started identifying as a feminist from my mid-teen years. I really got into social justice from my uni years. I was ethnocultural officer and [on] the women’s collective. I always wanted to do international development, but it didn’t take long to be disillusioned with the whole NGO-industrial complex—this real distance between the development worker and the people you’re supposed to be working on behalf of. 

Also, I’ve been a woman who uses drugs from my teen years. I had no idea there was this drug-user rights movement until I was volunteering in Kolkata while studying for my Masters in Melbourne. [I was] on methadone for heroin dependency, but only buprenorphine is available in India. 

This person stuck their neck out to connect me to this harm reduction clinic in the informal settlements of Kolkata. A project manager, who was also a peer, was able to get the doctor to prescribe me buprenorphine. This person [didn’t] know me but [was] helping me because he was [a] long-term drug-user advocate. Being a person who uses drugs and on opioid agonist treatment—there’s not many people that really understand the struggles. 

Then I joined the Asian Network of People Who Use Drugs, because I was based in Australia, and connected to INPUD, started going to conferences, became a board member and stepped into the ED role. INPUD brought my personal experience, that belief in people power, [together] with what I was professionally interested in, marrying the two. 

“One exciting project is getting user voices in research at a global level.”

CLH: What INPUD initiatives are you particularly proud of?

JC: [Since] I first arrived 10 years ago, we’ve seen the regional networks from the Global South come into their own. INPUD’s a much broader and diverse collective of voices and leaders scattered all over the world. It’s been amazing to see the growth and development of the networks, including women-led networks. 

There’s a lot more collaboration. For example, how to change the opiate agonist treatment landscape. Without coming together, there’s a sense that it’s worse in Georgia, or nowhere can be as bad as in South Africa, or wherever. But when we’re together [we see that] everywhere is controlling.

One exciting project is getting user voices in research at a global level. We’re working on a project funded under Unitaid, looking at introducing innovative tools and technologies such as low dead-space needles and syringes, and long-acting depot buprenorphine. 

There’s always been this tension between what service providers think versus [what’s] suitable to the lives of people who use drugs. We brought together this Global Community Advisory Board with diverse gender representation to inform World Health Organization research protocols on these two technologies across 10 low- and middle-income countries. 

One of our major priorities is decriminalization. We’re working with UNAIDS, Release and the University of Essex to develop the first decrim guidance for low- and middle-income countries. If you’re working in different contexts, you have to look at cultural adaptation. The networks interested in adapting narcofeminism campaigning are led by women, such as WRADAR, a sub-regional network across Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. And Scotland has just released their Charter of Human Rights for People Who Use Drugs. Can we adapt that to other countries? 

We did the Values and Preferences Study on WHO Consolidated Guidelines on Key Populations. That was the first time we were able to shape WHO recommendations. Seeing that link between people on the ground and big institutions like WHO, seeing it determined as best practice recommendations and taken up at country level, then funded through the Global Fund, has been amazing.

“Drug use was not seen as a valid choice—which is ironic, because the women’s rights movement has always been about bodily choice and autonomy.” 

CLH: You’re at the forefront of the new narcofeminist movement. How would you define narcofeminism?

JC: Narcofeminism is about recognizing the structural inequalities facing women who use drugs. A more expansive view of drug use, seeing it as an act of empowerment, recognizing there are beneficial aspects to women taking drugs. It’s also calling out feminism that hasn’t really recognized [the] links between prohibition and patriarchy. It’s very much linked to intersectionality, but the intersectionality of drug use. Bring[ing] together women in all our diversity, visibilizing women who use drugs and whose lives have been impacted by drug policies. Because we’ve been made so invisible. It’s a way for us to come out.

CLH: Why has mainstream feminism largely ignored women who use drugs? 

JC: [It’s] twofold. There’s the invisibility, linked to prohibition and criminalization. There’s real costs to coming out. And from the mainstream feminist side, [they say], “That’s criminal” or, if you were more generous, “Women who use drugs are victims.” Drug use was not seen as a valid choice—which is ironic, because the women’s rights movement has always been about bodily choice and autonomy. 

Feminism [has] always shut its doors, then been forced to include women from different classes, women of color, transgender women and sex workers. Women who use drugs and formerly incarcerated women were the last groups to truly be accepted. But I’ve seen changes. 

When I went to the AWID [Association for Women’s Rights in Development] conference in Brazil in 2016, people were like, “Oh, what can we do to help women who use drugs? To help them get off?” The opposite of what feminism should be. 

[Then, in] December, a whole delegation of us—30, 40 women who use drugs, formerly incarcerated women, women involved in the drug trade, women working in drug policy, harm reduction—turn up to AWID. We were visible, interacting with people, explaining about the war on drugs and why drug policy is a feminist issue. That was a huge moment for us, as a mass, to really enter into the feminist space.

“Trying drugs, and pursuing pleasure and different experiences that come from drugs is a feminist act, a form of rebellion.”

CLH: How can other feminists work in solidarity with women who use drugs?

JC: A lot is the underlying work of changing narratives and perspectives, campaigning on anti-stigma. That huge paradigm shift has to extend to the harm reduction industry. We still see a lot of inequities in data on gender, engagement, retainment and services. There are particular reasons women don’t feel comfortable within treatment settings. The medical establishment can be very patriarchal. 

There’s this very paternalistic treatment of [women who use drugs] as harm reduction has become more medicalized. There’s always a critique [that] when it started it was very grassroots, peer-to-peer. But over time, control around all the regulated substances, fear about diversion, linked with the stigma of drug use, creates settings that women don’t necessarily want to engage in. They [say], “I’d rather have my freedom than rely on this medical establishment. From one day to the next, I could be thrown off treatment. So I’d rather have that control and be out of the system.” 

Something as simple as take-home [methadone] doses. Nobody wants to travel every day to pick up their medication, but because of clinics’ fear of diversion it’s mandatory [for the first period] of treatment. There was so much rigidness. Then COVID happened, and suddenly a lot of centers had to give longer take-home doses and showed this is possible. 

If you want to look at creating services that suit that person, you have to take people’s actual lives into consideration when you’re designing things. If you look at data on diversion, it’s very, very minimal. It’s a way people freak out, [like] over welfare cheats.

CLH: That’s an excellent comparison. You’ve written that drug use is a feminist act. Please say more about that.  

JC: Narcofeminism is about looking at the alternatives to how we interpret drug use and recognizing that people’s experiences, why they start or continue to take drugs, are diverse. Risk-taking behavior amongst men is always considered more acceptable. Women are expected to be caretakers, put their own needs, their own pursuit of pleasure, in the back seat. When women do pursue their own pleasure, it’s seen as very nonconformist.

So it’s interpreting drug use as okay, challenging that idea that women shouldn’t be allowed to seek their own pleasure, that women shouldn’t be allowed to experiment and take risks. Trying drugs, continu[ing] to take drugs and pursuing pleasure and different experiences that come from drugs is a feminist act, a form of rebellion. A form of being able to control your own emotions and mental states, experimentation [with] your own body. 

“As long as we rely on the trauma trope, you’re going to see women who use drugs as victims. That has real implications for any kind of empowerment.”

CLH: You’ve also warned against assuming women’s drug use is rooted in trauma. Why? 

JC: As long as we rely on the trauma trope, you’re going to see women who use drugs as victims. That has real implications for any kind of empowerment, giving women who use drugs their own decision-making ability over their minds and bodies. 

We know that not all drug experiences are about trauma. A lot of people are going out and taking drugs for fun and experimentation and pleasure. Good things. 

Being in the community, speaking to a lot of women and people who use drugs—and I would say this for myself as well—drug use has [nonetheless] helped overcome some trauma. Those are the narratives we don’t really look at. 

In a lot of ways illicit drug use can be self-medication. People usually say that in a negative way. But sometimes it can be positive. Not all pharmaceutical drugs help people through trauma. There’s so many people seeing psychiatrists, getting antidepressants that don’t work for them, have adverse effects. Some people have actually found using illicit drugs helped them through the worst times of their life.

CLH: What’s next for you? And what are the key challenges and priorities for the movement? 

JC: I’m moving to Open Society Foundations, their local drug policy department. The funding side of things. Drug policy [will] always be close to my heart. I come from the community. It’s important to fund peer-led networks and marry that into broader objectives. 

There’s more challenges to international work than ever. We’ve been so used to having international guidelines, United Nations agencies being the standard bearers and giving recommendations. There’s challenges to the UN system, including human rights. We need to get human rights recognized and respected at regional level. Regional work will be more important as time goes on.

There’s huge disinformation campaigns. People don’t understand what decriminalization means. They expect it to change everything overnight. [They] link decriminalization to the rise of crime or expect decriminalization to fix homelessness. It’s not a panacea. 

“In a lot of meetings, conferences, the most powerful voice is the person who uses drugs who is able to cut through the jargon and the bullshit.”

There’s a lot more work to do around media, getting public support. Parties change, leaders change, and they can reverse things. Sustainable change [is] about changing the hearts and minds of people. The use of data or technical jargon can really put people off. You have to adapt to different audiences, using examples from people’s lives that they can see parallels with. 

INPUD’s all about having people who use drugs at the front lines. The most powerful way to do that is to have people with lived experience. Having voices from the Global South and gender diversity is very, very important. 

In a lot of meetings, conferences, the most powerful voice is the person who uses drugs [who is] able to cut through the jargon and the bullshit. We work so much in silos, preaching to the converted. How do we get the voices that have that legitimacy to speak to the broader public and get people not currently on our side? 

There’s a good foundation. I think the drug-user rights movement has done really amazing things over the last few years. It can go further.

Photograph of Judy Chang, speaking at the AWID conference in December 2024, courtesy of Chang

The Influence Foundation, which operates Filter, has previously received grants from the Open Society Foundations. Filter‘s Editorial Independence Policy applies.

The post Activist Judy Chang Talks Narcofeminism and Drug-User Rights  appeared first on Filter.

I’ve been researching how elements of two international treaties—each adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966—might enable a legal challenge to damaging prohibitions, which deny millions of people ways to improve their health.

Such an effort might draw upon the successful 1990s challenge to anti-gay laws in Australia, using the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

A legal challenge might also invoke the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, particularly in light of the evolving landscape of nicotine consumption and harm reduction strategies.

This effort could center on the human rights to health and self-determination under these treaties. But before we get ahead of ourselves, let’s take a closer look at the specifics.

What Is an Optional Protocol?

An Optional Protocol provides individuals and groups with an avenue to enforce their rights under a treaty. It extends the jurisdiction of the treaty’s supervisory body, typically a human rights committee or commission, to receive and consider complaints from those who believe their rights have been violated by their own government.

This useful pathway can give people access to international justice mechanisms when domestic remedies are exhausted or unavailable. It serves as a supplement to national courts, providing an alternative forum for adjudicating human rights claims.

People have previously exercised their right to complain under an Optional Protocol with dramatic success.

By lodging complaints under an Optional Protocol, people can bring international attention to human rights violations and hold governments accountable for actions that might otherwise go unaddressed.

Of the two treaties we’re discussing, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) came into force in 1976, with 174 parties, or countries that have ratified it; its Optional Protocol applies to 116 parties. Implementation of the ICCPR is the responsibility of the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), which is also tasked with receiving applicable complaints from individuals.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also took effect in 1976, with 172 parties; its Optional Protocol of 2013 has 46 signatories (countries that have signed up to it in principle) and 29 parties. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights oversees implementation and receives applicable communications from individuals.

People have previously exercised their right to complain under an Optional Protocol with dramatic success.

Historical Precedent

In the 1990s, Tasmania had some of the harshest anti-gay laws in Australia. These laws criminalized consensual sexual activity between adult men.

In 1992, Tasmanian citizens Nicholas Toonen and Rodney Croome lodged a communication with the UNHRC under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. They argued that Tasmania’s laws violated their rights to privacy, equality and freedom from discrimination under Articles 2, 17 and 26 of the ICCPR Covenant.

The UNHRC first conducted an admissibility review of the communication to determine if it met the criteria outlined in the First Optional Protocol. After finding that it did, the UNHRC proceeded to consider the merits of the complaint, before issuing its views in 1994, which resulted in the landmark case Toonen v. Australia.

The UNHRC concluded that Tasmania’s laws violated Article 17 (right to privacy) of the ICCPR. Following that decision—which was not legally binding, but exerted substantial international pressure—Australia repealed its anti-gay laws in 1997.

The Toonen case had broader legal and social implications beyond Australia, and influenced global legal reforms around similar discriminatory laws. It underscored the role of international human rights mechanisms in promoting equality and non-discrimination worldwide. And it exemplified how individuals and advocacy groups can leverage those mechanisms to challenge harmful legislation and advance human rights at the domestic level.

How might these lessons apply to nicotine?

The Right to Health 

It isn’t hard to envisage a comparable path to challenging measures like vape bans today. There’s clear potential to leverage similar mechanisms against public health policies perceived as violating individuals’ rights to health and access to harm reduction.

Article 12 of the ICESCR Covenant states that its parties “recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”

Plaintiffs could very plausibly argue that restricting access to less harmful nicotine alternatives constitutes a breach of their human right to health.

With this in mind, the First Optional Protocol to the ICESCR could potentially enable the initiation of a human rights case, under Article 12 of the Covenant, against governments that prohibit vaping. In this scenario, plaintiffs could very plausibly argue that restricting access to less harmful nicotine alternatives constitutes a breach of their human right to health.

Scientific evidence establishes beyond credible doubt that vapes, heated tobacco products and oral nicotine products are vastly less harmful than the cigarettes these products can replace.

It would follow, under this argument, that access to safer nicotine products is essential for protecting public health and fulfilling the right to health. Individuals could argue that governments have a duty under Article 12 to promote and facilitate access to effective harm reduction.

While cases focused solely on Article 12 are uncommon, its principles and provisions are often integrated into broader human rights advocacy efforts related to health. Arguments typically emphasize the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, highlighting how the right to health intersects with other rights such as non-discrimination, access to information, and participation in decision-making processes affecting health.

Article 2 of the ICESCR Covenant, meanwhile, prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of rights, including the right to health. If governments allow smoking while banning vaping—as many do—individuals could argue that this constitutes unjustifiable discrimination against people who choose vaping as the safer alternative—especially if there is evidence of disparate impact on marginalized communities.

While governments are regarded as having a legitimate interest in regulating potentially harmful products, they must do so in a manner that respects people’s rights to health and non-discrimination. A vaping ban shown to be disproportionate or arbitrary compared to the regulation of smoking could therefore be vulnerable under ICESCR Covenant Articles 12 and 2.

But those aren’t the only relevant rights at stake.

The Right to Self-Determination

Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR provide for the human right to self-determination—which concerns “the fundamental right of people to shape their own lives.”

In a practical sense, self-determination means that we have the freedom to live well, and to determine, according to our own values and beliefs, what it means to live well. It means that we have a choice in how our lives are governed; that we participate in decisions that affect our lives; and that we have a degree of control over our lives and future.

Individuals might well argue, under either treaty, that restrictions on access to less harmful alternatives to cigarettes infringe upon rights to self-determination—particularly if they can demonstrate that such restrictions disproportionately limit their freedom to make autonomous choices regarding their health and well-being.

It might be asserted that the right to make autonomous choices about one’s health and lifestyle is inherent to the principles of self-determination and personal autonomy protected under these covenants.

Individuals could contend that restrictions disproportionately impact certain groups, and thereby violate ICCPR principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Although the ICCPR does not explicitly recognize a right to health, it encompasses broader principles on the protection of people’s physical and mental well-being. Individuals could argue that access to tobacco harm reduction products is essential for promoting their health and well-being.

Individuals could additionally contend that restrictions disproportionately impact certain groups—such as people seeking to quit smoking, people who rely on safer nicotine alternatives for harm reduction, and members of communities overrepresented in these categories—and thereby violate ICCPR principles of equality and non-discrimination. The success of such efforts would depend on the details of the case, and on the interpretation and application of ICCPR rights by the UNHRC.

Speaking more generally, international human rights law encompasses a broad range of other rights that could be relevant.

One example is the right to freedom of expression—which might apply if people who use vapes or other safer nicotine options consider their use a form of personal expression or lifestyle choice.

Bans could also raise concerns about privacy rights, if they involve intrusive surveillance or monitoring of individuals’ habits.

Restrictions on purchasing certain products may also engage individuals’ rights to privacy and autonomy. While governments are regarded as having a legitimate interest in regulating sales of certain products to protect public health, such measures should not unduly intrude upon individuals’ personal autonomy or decision-making processes. Restrictions should be proportionate and respect individuals’ rights to make informed choices about their health and well-being.

Such arguments could support legal challenges to contest vaping bans and promote alternative regulatory approaches that respect individuals’ rights and promote public health.

Now that we’ve established the key rights potentially in play, how could advocates proceed?

How to Move Forward

Bringing a case along these lines against governments that ban vapes or other safer nicotine products would involve several steps. But it would first require the government in question to be a party to either the ICCPR or the ICESCR, and a party to the relevant First Optional Protocol.

Relatively few governments (29) are parties to the First Optional Protocol to the ICESCR Covenant, so the Article 12 route is limited. However, most governments (116) are party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, so complaints based on the human right to self-determination could be more widely applicable.

For either pathway, the first step involves gathering evidence and documentation to support the case. This includes compiling information on the restrictions, on the impact on individuals’ rights, and on any relevant domestic legal remedies that have been pursued or exhausted. This UN guide is helpful in determining what might constitute and meet the exhaustion requirements.

Individuals affected by the restrictions—such as vapers, vape shop owners, public health advocates or organizations representing their interests—would need to be identified as petitioners in the case.

The petitioners would then formally submit a complaint, or communication, to either the UNHRC (under the ICCPR) or the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (under the ICESCR), outlining the alleged violation.

The government in question would be expected to provide a response, and to take appropriate measures to remedy the human rights violation identified.

Upon receiving the communication, the relevant committee would conduct an admissibility review, and then—if the communication is deemed admissible—consider the merits of the case before issuing its views on the matter.

Those views would not, in themselves, force a government to change course. But coming from the United Nations, they would carry substantial moral and political weight for any government signed up to the relevant treaty. The government in question would be expected to provide a response, and to take appropriate measures to remedy the human rights violation identified.

Invoking international human rights mechanisms to fight for access to tobacco harm reduction would certainly face obstacles and counterarguments. But depending on the arguments used, they might be informed and supported by a variety of other international bodies, principles and legal resources.

It might be necessary, in all cases, to draw on the Vienna Declaration on the Law of Treaties 1969, in which Articles 31 and 32 concern the interpretation of treaties.

It should be noted that the 1948 Constitution of the World Health Organization recognizes “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” as “one of the fundamental rights of every human being.” While it does not explicitly define this right or elaborate on its scope, this foundational principle is meant to guide the WHO in promoting global health and addressing health inequalities. (When it comes to tobacco harm reduction, of course, the WHO has fallen disastrously short.)

The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control meanwhile came into force in 2005. It explicitly recognises the right to health as a guiding principle in its preamble and provisions, recalling both Article 12 of the ICESCR and the WHO Constitution. The FCTC objectives align with the broader human rights framework that recognizes health as a fundamental human right. Most significantly, it explicitly defines “tobacco control” programs to include harm reduction strategies.

In May 2024, the UN special rapporteur on the right to health, an independent expert appointed by the UNHRC, issued a call for inputs on “harm reduction for sustainable peace and development” as part of a thematic report to be presented to the General Assembly in October 2024. The aim is to gather information on harm reduction practices, policies, and their impact on public health and human rights, particularly in the context of drug use and related laws.

Successfully leveraging such mechanisms would be guaranteed to lead to international scrutiny, and the kind of pressure—and likely, embarrassment—that makes policy change probable.

The special rapporteur’s responsibilities are significant in terms of efforts to protect the right to use less harmful nicotine alternatives. The special rapporteur assesses global implementation of the right to health, identifying challenges, best practices, and gaps, and submits annual reports to the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. The rapporteur also investigates allegations of violations of the right to health, including discrimination.

Successfully leveraging human rights mechanisms through the ICCPR or ICESCR in support of tobacco harm reduction would be guaranteed to lead to international scrutiny, and the kind of pressure—and likely, embarrassment—that makes policy change probable.

Anyone pursuing this will need a strategic, well-coordinated approach, involving thorough understanding of the legal frameworks, collaboration with local and international experts, meticulous documentation, and persistent advocacy for implementation. 

But it could be a means for advocates, led by consumers, to create a powerful coalition—not only fighting against bans of safer nicotine products, but also promoting broader recognition of harm reduction as a fundamental human right.

Photograph of Palais des Nations by United States Mission Geneva via Flickr/Creative Commons 2.0

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“Panama and our Darién are not a transit route. It is our border,” Mulino stated May 9 after the final vote was tallied. “The Darién odyssey … does not have a reason to exist.”

Mulino, 64, was declared the winner with a little over one-third of the vote. His five-year term will begin July 1.

After former President Ricardo Martinelli’s wife, Marta Linares de Martinelli, declined to be his running mate, Mulino was tapped for the position. But in March, Martinelli was disqualified following a money laundering conviction; he remains in the Nicaraguan embassy where he has sought refuge since February.

Mulino served in Martinelli’s cabinet from 2009 to 2014. Mulino has stated that one of the achievements of the former administration was to “recover” the Darién Gap from “the hands of narco-guerillas” in Colombia. In 2010, Martinelli’s administration built a security base in the region to choke off shipments of food.

“With international aid we will begin a process of repatriation, in full compliance with the human rights of all the people there,” Mulino stated in his speech May 9.

“It just makes smugglers more emboldened, and they charge more. It will exacerbate the problem.”

In 2023, an estimated 520,000 people made their way north through the Darién Gap—more than double the estimate from 2022. The vast majority were from Venezuela. An estimated one in five people crossing the Darién Gap are minors; one in 10 under are estimated to be under the age of 5.

The Darién is a remote region, with high mountains, rainforest and swamps that make the crossing already dangerous. But it is also notoriously violent—reports of widespread robbery, rape and human trafficking have emerged as armed militia operate in region.

For the past several years, the Darién Gap has been controlled by the Gulf Clan. During Martinelli’s presidency, before a landmark peace accord in 2016, it was controlled by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Bill Ong Hing, founding director of the Immigration and Deportation Defense Clinic at the University of San Francisco, fears that Mulino’s plan will strengthen armed groups, increasing the violence.

“One of the reasons [Mulino is] giving is he actually wants to cut down on the abuse,” Hing told Filter. “But those industries are going to continue no matter what. I’ve seen this with respect to the US militarized southern border, it just makes smugglers more emboldened and they charge more. It will exacerbate the problem.”

“It’s pretty evident there’s [US] money behind this.”

The United States has played a significant role in the crackdowns.  In April 2023, the US, Panama and Colombia announced a coordinated attempt to end migration through the Darién Gap. That September, Panama increased deportations and further stricter visa requirements.

Hing, who has worked with people who arrived in the US after crossing the Darién, said the budget for these efforts often comes from USAID grants. “It’s pretty evident there’s [US] money behind this.”

While most people he’s worked with are fleeing violence, Hing said that the climate crisis is a rapidly growing factor in mnigration through the Darién as well.

“It’s more difficult for low-wage workers in different regions,” he said. “That’s something the world has to content with.”

Image via Wikimedia Commons/Creative Commons 4.0

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